The Standard is Respecting the Rule of Law. This is true for two reasons.

A. The rule of law is necessary to protect individual liberty against arbitrary and unfair government power. Darryl Brown[[1]](#footnote-1):

The rule of… in political struggle.

B. The rule of law is necessary for trust in government and respect for the individual. Hollander-Blumoff and Tyler 2011[[2]](#footnote-2):

And yet procedural… for those rights.

CONTENTION 1: Attorney-client privilege serves not just to protect individuals’ secrets, but to instill respect for the law. Weigold ‘06[[3]](#footnote-3)

The attorney-client… the right thing. 169

CONTENTION 2: Attorney-client privilege is necessary to protect a defendant’s 6th Amendment rights.

A. ACP protects the 6th amendment right to a zealous advocate. Dashjian 1982[[4]](#footnote-4):

If a state… they represent. 14

Active, partisan advocacy… to the prosecution.17

B. ACP preserves effective assistance of counsel by ensuring attorney’s ability to investigate. Dashjian 2[[5]](#footnote-5):

The denial of… for a full investigation. 3

C. ACP is necessary to preserve defendants’ fifth amendment protection against self-incrimination. Dashjian 3[[6]](#footnote-6):

Belge and Kociolek do.. the fifth amendment.

Therefore, truth-seeking must give way to the protection of individual rights. Dashjian 4[[7]](#footnote-7):

The state's interest… search for truth:84

Thus, if privileges… constitutional rights underlying it.

1. Darryl Brown. 1997. [Professor, Washington & Lee University School of Law. “Jury Nullification Within the Rule of Law.” 81 Minn. L. Rev. 1149.] [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. Rebecca Hollander-Blumoff [Associate Professor, Washington University Law School] and Tom R. Tyler [Professor, Psychology and Law, New York University], “SYMPOSIUM: Procedural Justice and the Rule of Law: Fostering Legitimacy in Alternative Dispute Resolution,” 2011 J. Disp. Resol. 1, pp. 1-17. [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
3. Ursula H Weigold [Director of Legal Research and Writing and Clinical Associate Professor of Law at the University of Wisconsin Law School], “The case for compulsory voting,” *Pepperdine Law Review*, Vol. 33. April (2006), pp. 677-722. NS [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
4. Michael B. Dashjian [J.D., Boalt Hall School of Law, UC Berkeley], People v. Meredith: The Attorney-Client Privilege and the Criminal Defendant's Constitutional Rights, 70 Cal. L. Rev. 1048 (1982).

   Available at: http://scholarship.law.berkeley.edu/californialawreview/vol70/iss4/10 [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
5. Michael B. Dashjian [J.D., Boalt Hall School of Law, UC Berkeley], People v. Meredith: The Attorney-Client Privilege and the Criminal Defendant's Constitutional Rights, 70 Cal. L. Rev. 1048 (1982).

   Available at: http://scholarship.law.berkeley.edu/californialawreview/vol70/iss4/10 [↑](#footnote-ref-5)
6. Michael B. Dashjian [J.D., Boalt Hall School of Law, UC Berkeley], People v. Meredith: The Attorney-Client Privilege and the Criminal Defendant's Constitutional Rights, 70 Cal. L. Rev. 1048 (1982).

   Available at: http://scholarship.law.berkeley.edu/californialawreview/vol70/iss4/10 [↑](#footnote-ref-6)
7. Michael B. Dashjian [J.D., Boalt Hall School of Law, UC Berkeley], People v. Meredith: The Attorney-Client Privilege and the Criminal Defendant's Constitutional Rights, 70 Cal. L. Rev. 1048 (1982).

   Available at: http://scholarship.law.berkeley.edu/californialawreview/vol70/iss4/10 [↑](#footnote-ref-7)